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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AND NEGLIGENT
THIRD PARTIES
A problem confronting the courts with increasing regularity' is that
of determining who is a third party against whom a workman, covered
by the Workmen's Compensation Act, may pursue a common law
remedy. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has consistently
held that the purpose of the Virginia statute is to limit the recovery
of workmen to compensation and to deny an injured workman a
recovery in a common law action, unless the negligent party is clearly
a stranger to the workman's employment.2 In Anderson v. Thorington
Constr. Co.,3 the court was called upon to determine whether two
independent contractors working for a common employer on the same
project bore the relationship of third parties to each other's employees.4
It was held that since the owner was the statutory employer of each, the
independent contractors were not third parties; therefore plaintiff's ex-
clusive remedy was workmen's compensation. 5
Prior to the adoption of the Workmen's Compensation Acts, an
employer was liable for injuries to his employees resulting from his
negligence." However, liability was not imposed on the employer in
the majority of cases 7 because the injured employee, in addition to
having the burden of proving the employer's negligence, was sub-
ject to the common law defenses of contributory negligence, voluntary
assumption of risk, and the fellow servant doctrine.8 Under the Work-
men's Compensation Acts an employer gives up his common law de-
'Smith v. John B. Kelley, Inc., 275 F.2d 169, 172 (D.C. Cir. 196o) (concurring
opinion).
2Doane v. E. 1. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 29o F.2d 921, 926 (4th Cir. 1954) (ap-
plying Virginia law); Sykes v. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp., 186 Va. 116, 125, 41 S.E.2d
4j69, 472 (1947); Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 102, 38 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1946).
12o Va. 266, no S.E.2d 396 (1959), appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 719 (196o).
'The scope of this comment will be confined to this issue and will not consider
plaintiff's contention, which the court rejected, "that because the act creating the
Authority provides that it is 'created and constituted a political subdivision of the
Commonwealth,' it is not an 'owner' within the meaning of § 65-26 .... Id. at 273,
i o S.E.2d at 401. The court's rejection of this argument was reaffirmed in Williams
v. E. T. Gresham Co., 2o Va. 457, 465, 111 S.E.2d 498, 504 ('959)-
2o1 Va. at 272, 11o S.E.2d at 40o. This holding was later cited with approval in
Williams v. E. T. Gresham CO., 201 Va. 457, 462-63, 111 S.E.2d 498, 502-03 (1959).
ai Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 4.1-.30 (1952) (hereinafter cited as
Larson); Prosser, Torts § 67 (2d ed. 1955).
7One writer estimates that 8o% of the cases resulted in favor of employers. Horo-
vitz, Current Trends in Basic Principles of Workmen's Compensation, 12 Law Soc.
J- 465, 467 (1947)-
81 Larson § 4.30; Prosser, Torts § 68 (2d ed. 1955).
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fenses and is made liable without fault, while a workman gives up
his common law action for negligence in return for certain, though
limited, compensation irrespective of fault.
9
All states now have 'Workmen's Compensation Acts
10 which, al-
though differing widely in their terms, are based upon the idea that
an industrial accident is a cost of production." In keeping with this
enterprise theory of compensation, most states have adopted the statu-
tory employer concept,12 which makes the owner'
3 or principal contrac-
tor1 4 a statutory employer, and makes all persons engaged in the "trade,
business or occupation" of the owner or principal contractor statutory
employees subject to the terms of the Act. At the same time, however,
all states recognize an employee's right to a common law action against
a negligent third party.' 5 The majority of statutes provide that an
injured worker can maintain an action against "persons other than
the employer" or against "third persons."'
10 Some acts,' 7 such as that
of Virginia, provide for a common law action against the "other
party" Is while stipulating that compensation shall be the exclusive
OThomas v. George Hyman Constr. Go., 173 F. Supp. 381, 382 (D.D.C. 1959);
Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 98, 38 S.E.2d 73, 74 (1946); Prosser, Torts § 69 (2d ed.
1955).
"Prosser, Torts § 69 (2d ed. 1955).
uThomas v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 173 F. Supp. 381, 382 (D.D.C. 1959);
McCoid, The Third Person in the Compensation Picture: A Study of the Liabili-
ties and Rights of Non-Employers, 37 Texas L. Rev. 389, 396-97 (1959) (hereinafter
cited as McCoid).
'Forty-one states have statutory employer type statutes. a Larson § 72.31.
""When any person (in this section and §§ 65-28 and 65-29 referred to as
owner') undertakes to perform or execute any work which is a part of his trade,
business or occupation and contracts with any other person (in this section and
§§ 65-28 to 65-31 referred to as 'sub-contractor') for the execution or performance
by or under such sub-contractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken
by such owner, the owner shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in the
work any compensation under this Act which he would have been liable to pay if
the workman had been immediately employed by him." Va. Code Ann. § 65-26 (195o).
"1"When any person (in this and the four succeeding sections referred to as
contractor') contracts to perform or execute any work for another person which work
or undertaking is not a part of the trade, business or occupation of such other per-
son and contracts with any other person (in this section and §§ 65-28, 65-29, 65-30
and 65-31 referred to as 'sub-contractor) for the execution or performance by or
under the sub-contractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken by such
contractor, then the contractor shall be liable to pay to any workman employed in
the work any compensation under this Act which he would have been liable to pay
if that workman had been immediately employed by him." Va. Code Ann. § 65-27
(i95o)-
"McCoid, Note it supra, at 393-
-Id. at 403 & n.49.
11d. at 403-04 & n.5o.
"The making of a lawful claim against an employer for compensation ... shall
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remedy against the employer and "those conducting his business."'1
A major problem arises when the courts, in an effort to ascertain
legislative intent, attempt to define "other party" or "third party."
The test usually employed is whether the work being done at the time
of the injury was part of the "trade, business or occupation" of the
owner or principal contractor; if so, he is not an "other party" amen-
able to a common law action.
20
Two basic factual relationships are presented in these third party
cases-vertical and horizontal. In the classic vertical line the parties
are in privity with one another, whereas in the more unique horizontal
line the parties are not in privity nor is one working under the other's
control.21 The primary distinguishing factor is that in a vertical re-
lationship the general contractor is liable for compensation to the
subcontractor's employees; whereas in a horizontal relationship the
general contractor, who has contracted with two independent con-
tractors to perform separate services, may be liable for compensation
to the employees of the independent contractors,2 2 but one indepen-
dent contractor is not liable for compensation to the employees of the
other independent contractor.23
operate as an assignment to the employer of any right to recover damages which the
injured employee... may have against-any other party... Va. Code Ann. § 65-38
(1950).
""Every employer subject to the compensation provisions of this Act shall insure
the payment of compensation to his employees in the manner hereinafter provided.
While such insurance remains in force he or those conducting his business shall
only be liable to an employee for personal injury or death by accident to the extent
and in the manner herein specified." Va. Code Ann. 65-99 (1950).
n0Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wallace, 172 F.2d 802, 8o6 (4th Cir. 1949) (applying
Virginia law). It is to be noted that the common law control test is no longer a factor
in the statutory employer sections; furthermore, it is not determinative in the third
party cases. See Schulte v. American Box Board Co., 358 Mich. 21, 99 N.W.2d 367,
372 (1959) (concurring opinion).
"Anderson v. Dixie Drilling Co., 173 F. Supp. 21, 22 (W.D. La. 1959). This dis-
tinction is not generally recognized, probably because there are relatively few cases
that present the horizontal relationship.
JAn owner is liable for compensation to employees of independent contractors
if the independent contractors are engaged in the trade, business or occupation of the
owner. See Anderson v. Thorington Constr. Co., 201 Va. 266, i1o S.E.2d 396 (1959).
On the other hand, an owner is not liable for compensation if the independent con-
tractors are not engaged in the trade, business or occupation of the owner. See
Kramer v. Kramer, 199 Va. 4o9, 1oo S.E.2d 37 (1957). Furthermore, the Virginia
statute provides: "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to make, for the purpose
of this Act, the employees of an independent contractor the employees of the per-
son or corporation employing or contracting with such independent contractor." Va.
Code Ann. § 65-5 (1950).
nOThe Act is not controlling if the employer-employee relationship does not exist
in fact, or is not created by statute. Kramer v. Kramer, 199 Va. 409, 418, ioo S.E.2d
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The vertical line usually has four parties in interest-4-an owner,
general contractor, subcontractor, and an employee who is injured
through the negligence of one of the parties. The problem in such a
situation is in determining who is an "other party" on the ascending-
descending scale. The Virginia statute provides that an owner or
general contractor is liable for compensation if the employee is en-
gaged in work which the owner or general contractor has undertaken
to have performed as part of his own trade, business or occupation. 25
Under such circumstances, an owner or general contractor is deemed
to be the statutory employer of his subcontractor's employees, and
as such is not an "other party" amenable to a common law action by
an employee of his subcontractor.20 However, if the work being
performed by an employee is not a part of the owner's or general
contractor's business, then he is amenable to a common law action for
his negligence.27 Moreover, just as the Act bars a common law action
37, 44 (1957). There is no employer-employee relationship between the employee of
one independent contractor, i.e., Anderson, and the other independent contractor,
i.e., Thorington. Thus, no liability for compensation exists.
In Kramer the court said that "if the employee cannot sue another independent
contractor at common law, it must be because under the compensation law the
plaintiff is the employee of the defendant ..." However, this reasoning is extended
by Thorington where it is seen that non-liability for compensation is not necessarily
co-extensive with common law liability.
'Sykes v. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp., 186 Va. 116, 123, 41 S.E.2d 469, 472
(1947); Bamber v. City of Norfolk, 138 Va. 26, 33, 121 S.E. 564, 566 (1924).
-Va. Code Ann. § 65-26 (1950) (owner); Va. Code Ann. § 65-27 (1950) (contractor).
See notes 13 and 14 supra. The owner is liable for compensation if the work being
performed is part of the trade, business or occupation of the owner. However, if the
work is not part of the trade, business or occupation of the owner and the owner
contracts with someone else to perform such work, the contractor and not the owner
is liable for compensation. Sykes v. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp., 186 Va. 116, 124-25,
41 S.E.2d 469, 472 (1947)-
2Owner: Corban v. Skelly Oil Co., 256 F.2d 775 (5th Cir. 1958); Maryland Cas.
Co. v. Gulf Ref. Co., 110 So. 2d 784 (La. App. 1959); Stansbury v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co., 91 So. 2d 917 (La. App. 1957); Sykes v. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp., 186 Va.
116, 122, 41 S.E.2d 469, 472 (1947) (dictum).
General contractor: Home Idem. Co. v. Poladian, 27o F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1959)
(applying Virginia law); McCann v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.,
177 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1959); McEvilly v. L. E. Myers Co., 211 Ky. 31, 276 S.W.
io68, 1071 (1925); Bunner v. Patti, 343 Mo. 274, 121 S.W.2d 153 (1938); Sykes v. Stone
& Webster Eng'r Corp., 186 Va. 116,41 S.E.2d 469 (1947)-
Contra, Thomas v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 173 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1959);
Schulte v. American Box Board Co., 358 Mich. 21, 99 N.W.2d 367 (x959); Wilson v.
Faull, 45 N.J. Super. 555, 133 A.2d 695 (App. Div. 1957); Cutillo v. Emory Housing
Corp., 19 Misc. 2d 865, 19o N.Y.S.2d 502 (Sup. Ct. 1959). See generally io8 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 155 (1959)-
=Owner: Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Wallace, 172 F.2d 8o2 (4th Cir. 1949) (applying
Virginia law); Battistelli v. Connohio Inc., 138 Conn. 646, 88 A.2d 372 (1952); Jones
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on the ascending scale, Virginia has also held that the Act bars an
action on the descending scale, thereby preventing an employee of
the owner or general contractor from maintaining an action against
a subcontractor. 2s
The horizontal line, on the other hand, is illustrated by the An-
derson case.29 The Richmond-Petersburg Turnpike Authority con-
tracted with an engineering firm, plaintiff's employer, to act as con-
sulting engineers and to supervise the construction. The Authority also
contracted with the defendant, Thorington, to perform construction
work. In the performance of this contract, Anderson was injured by
one of Thorington's employees. The trial court sustained defendant's
special plea and held that the case was within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the Industrial Commission of Virginia. The Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals affirmed, and, recognizing the trial court's holding
that Thorington and the engineering firm were independent contrac-
tors, held that Thorington and plaintiff's employer were both en-
gaged in the trade, business or occupation of the Authority. Thus,
Thorington was not an "other party" within the meaning of the Act
and was not amenable to a common law action.3 0 The court further
reasoned that Anderson and the employees of Thorington were both
v. Florida Power Corp., 72 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954); Ball v. Kaiser Alumnium & Chem.
Corp., 112 So. 2d 741 (La. App. 1959).
General contractor: Garrett v. Tubular Prods. Inc., 176 F. Supp. 101 (E.D. Va.
1959).
nDoane v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 2o9 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1954) (apply-
ing Virginia law); Williams v. E. T. Gresham Co., 201 Va. 457, 111 S.E.2d 498 (1959);
Rea v. Ford, 198 Va. 712, 96 S.E.2d 92 (1957)- In reasoning that a subcontractor is
not an "other party" within the meaning of the Act, it has been pointed out that
"there is nothing to indicate that while a workman is so engaged, he has a common
law right of action against any contractor or workman below him in the descending
line." Doane v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., supra at 925-26; Rea v. Ford, supra
at 717, 96 S.E. 2d at 95.
The majority of jurisdictions that have considered this question have held
that a sub-contractor is a third party, 2 Larson § 72.32, reasoning that the statute
operates downward as far as liability for compensation is concerned and upward as
far as the employee's rights of compensation are concerned, thus permitting the
workman to maintain a common law action against someone below him on the
descending line. Dillman v. John Diebold & Son Stone Co., 241 Ky. 631, 44 S.W.2d
581, 583 (1931)-
2The issue presented by the principal case had been considered by the Virginia
court only two years earlier in Kramer v. Kramer, 199 Va. 409, 100 S.E.2d 37 (1957).
However, in that case the owner was not engaged in the business of the contractor
and was thus a stranger to the employment, or an "other party." The court held
that an employee of one independent contractor could maintain a common law action
against another independent contractor where there was no common statutory em-
ployer. Accord, Pimental v. John E. Cox Co., 299 Mass. 579, 13 N.E.ad 441 (1938).
See Miami Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Kindt, 48 So. 2d 84o, 842 (Fla. 195o) .
w°ol. Va. at 272, 110 S.E.2d at 4oo, applying § 65-38 of the Act, supra note 18.
196o)
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statutory employees of the Authority. This being so, the employees of
the two independent contractors were "statutory fellow servants" and
as such were not entitled to maintain a negligence action against
one another or against their respective employers.
8 1
It is apparent that in the principal case Anderson would have had
no cause of action against the Authority if he had been injured by
an employee of the Authority-since he was engaged in its "business"
the Authority was not an "other party."3 2 But, in Anderson, it was
further reasoned that as the Authority was the statutory employer of
both contractors, one independent contractor was not an "other party"
with relation to an employee of the other. In so concluding the court is
applying to the horizontal relationship the same statutory concept that
is normally applied to the vertical relationship.
In holding that a statutory fellow servant is not an "other party"
subject to a common law action, the court relied on its previous de-
cision in Feitig v. Chalkley.33 In that case the court held that a co-
employee is included in the phrase "those conducting his business"
and that a workman injured through the negligence of a fellow worker
is bound by his exclusive remedy under the Act. It was reasoned that
an injury by a fellow worker is an inherent risk contemplated by the
Act, and the burden of such industrial accidents should be shared
by the entire enterprise as an industrial cost.3 4 Some jurisdictions
immunize the fellow servant,33 either by statute or judicial decision,
and this result is well supported by the theory of the Acts.8 6 One
authority suggests that by accepting the terms of the Act the employee,
as well as the employer, should be free from common law liability.3 7
31 Id. at 272, 11o S.E.2d at 400-01, applying § 65-26 of the Act, supra note '13.
3McCann v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 177 F. Supp. 909, 912
(E.D. Va. 1959); see note 26 supra and accompanying text.
MiS5 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d 73 (1946).
mId. at 102, 38 S.E.2d at 76.
•Rylander v. Chicago Short Line Ry., 17 1l1. 2d 618, 161 N.E.2d 812, 818 (1958);
Bresnahan v. Barre, 286 Mass. 593, 19o N.E. 815 (1934); Rauch v. Jones, 4 N.Y.2d
592, 152 N.E.2d 63, 176 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1958); Phillips v. Brinkley, 194 Va. 62, 72
S.E.2d 339 (1952); Feitig v. Chalkley, 185 Va. 96, 38 S.E.2d 73 (1946); 2 Larson §
72.20. Contra, Gee v. Horvath, 169 Ohio St. 14, 157 N.E.2d 354 (1959); Zimmer v.
Casey, 296 Pa. 529, 146 At. 130 (1929).
3omment, 1o Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 274, 279-80 (1953); Note, 43 Iowa L. Rev. 352,
355-56 (1958); Note, 39 Va. L. Rev. 951, 953 (1953)-
"That result follows from the basic purpose of workmen's compensation to place
the cost of industrial accidents upon the industry. That purpose would be blunted if
the cost of those accidents was shifted from one employee to another within the in-
dustry. So far as persons within the industry are concerned, the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act eliminated fault as a basis for liability." Rylander v. Chicago Short Line
Ry., 17 111. 2d 618, 161 N.E.2d 812, 818 (1959).
32 Larson § 72.20.
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This suggestion is well supported by the fact that the employee is
merely the alter ego of the employer, and as such should be entitled
to enjoy the same benefits.
In applying the rule of the Feitig case to the factual situation
presented in Anderson, some might think that the court has stretched
the logical limits of this reasoning to an extreme which would pro-
duce unjust results to an injured workman who has received in-
adequate compensation.38 However, other jurisdictions have reached
like results,3 9 and these decisions appear to be supported by the theory
of workmen's compensation. The result reached by the Virginia court
finds further justification in Professor Larson's suggestion that an
employee who has accepted the terms of the Act should also be granted
immunity from common law actions.4 0
Thus it appears that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in
dealing with the increasing attempts to maintain common law ac-
tions against third parties, has adhered to the original theory and
purpose of the Act by making workmen's compensation an exclusive
remedy, unless the negligent party is clearly a stranger to the em-
ployment. In this era of highly specialized work and large construc-
tion projects employing many contractors, it becomes readily apparent
that to hold otherwise would in many instances cast the burden of
industrial accidents on the employees, thereby abandoning the original
theory and purpose of the Acts-the concept of enterprise liability.
3E. MICHAEL MASINTER
"As compensation payments are scaled according to injury there are many cases
where a worker receives inadequate compensation for his injury and loss of work.
See Larson, "Model-T" Compensation Acts in the Atomic Age, 18 NACCA L. J. 39
(1956).
"Miami Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v. Kindt, 48 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1950); Pimental
v. John E. Cox Co., 299 Mass. 579, 13 N.E.2d 441, 444 (1938); Dresser v. New Hamp-
shire Structural Steel CO., 296 Mass. 97, 4 N.E.2d 1012 (1936). Contra, Anderson v.
Dixie Drilling Co., 173 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. La. 1959); Rota-Cone Oil Field Operating
Co. v. Chamness, 197 Okla. io3, 168 P.2d 1007 (1946). In the Miami Roofing and
Dresser cases, the problem was whether an employee of one subcontractor can main-
tain a common law action against another subcontractor on the same job where
both subcontractors are performing work for the same general contractor. It is
submitted that this issue is identical with the issue presented by the principal case
and these decisions are controlling.
'"See note 37 and accompanying text.
i96o]
